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SUMMARY
Market-based strategies are promoted as neoliberal
governance solutions to environmental problems, from
local to global scales. Tradable mitigation schemes
are proliferating. These include species banking, which
enables payments for the purchase of species credits
awarded to conserved areas to offset development
impacts on protected species elsewhere. An analysis of
species banks in the USA through a survey of data from
the website www.SpeciesBanking.com (established as
a ‘clearing house’ for species banking information)
was complemented by questionnaire material from
USA bank managers. The number of USA species
banks has increased rapidly, bank area ownership
and management is consolidated in a small number
of organizations, and public information on species
credit price is limited. In interrogating the case
material, the roles of specific economic policies
associated with neoliberalism are considered, focusing
on the extension of privatization, de- and re-regulation
and marketization into the arena of environmental
conservation, and commodification processes as
manifested in species banking. Problematic ecological
and distributive ‘concealments’ in species banking
include the ‘development-led’ nature of conservation
banking, tendencies towards net biodiversity loss,
and an emphasis on supporting conservation-related
wealth accumulation by larger landowners and
investors.
Keywords: biodiversity, commodification, ecosystem services,
markets, mitigation, neoliberal conservation, species banking,
SpeciesBanking.com
INTRODUCTION
Market mechanisms are being embraced to curb species loss
and sustain the ‘ecosystem services’ provided by biodiversity
(MA [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment] 2005; Bayon 2008,
p. 124; Bayon & Jenkins 2010). Offset markets, whereby harm
in one location is mitigated through trade in conservation
∗Correspondence: Dr Sian Sullivan e-mail: s.sullivan@bbk.ac.uk
credits awarded to a different location, have become
popular and profitable choices in conservation, proposed
for the entrepreneurial mitigation of environmental damage
regionally, nationally and internationally (UNEP/IUCN
[United Nations Environment Programme/International
Union for Conservation of Nature] 2007; Carroll et al.
2008). These approaches are consistent with the neoliberal
orientation to economic policy that has been expanding
globally since its inception in the west in the 1970s. Although
complex and producing diverse outcomes in different localities
(Larner 2000), neoliberalism tends to promote private sector
solutions to problems through subsidized creation of new
markets for new commodities. It is supported by a range of
consistent de- and re-regulation policies by government and
often enhances inequalities in the distribution of resources and
income (Peck & Tickell 2002; Harvey 2007; Castree 2008a, b;
Foucault 2008[1979]).
Market-based approaches to conservation management
deserve attention in conservation science for a number of
reasons. As noted in several recent papers, restrictions in
policy and research towards ecological measures amenable to
commoditisation may constrain both ecological understanding
and conservation outcomes (Peterson et al. 2009; Vira &
Adams 2009; Walker et al. 2009; Norgaard 2010). The creation
of conservation credits such as species credits as ‘standard,
noncontroversial’ units to be sold on conservation markets,
for example, requires that complex ecological processes and
functions become simplified into ‘proxy indicators’ that
can easily be traded (Robertson 2009, p. 4). These may
derive from understandings of ecological functions that
are incomplete or nascent (Muradian et al. 2010), and
may ignore debates in conservation science with respect
to the indicators themselves, as well as dismiss less well
understood, or unknown but highly relevant indicators
(Fleischer & Fox 2008; Kosoy & Corbera 2010). Problems
may arise through creating tradable biodiversity indicators
that overlook the possible taxonomic distinctiveness and intra-
specific genetic variation associated with populations, or the
influence of temporal characteristics (for example new growth
forests exhibit greater biodiversity than old growth forests;
Elswerth & Haney 2001). Through making habitats and
species populations in different localities commensurable with
(Robertson 2004) and substitutable or tradable for each other,
place-based geographies of variability, distinctiveness, and
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temporal characteristics in species populations and habitats are
discounted or not even considered. Selected indicators thus
may serve not only to conserve ecosystems, but to intentionally
or unintentionally drive ecosystems in particular directions, as
well as to redistribute ecological character at landscape levels
(Robertson & Hayden 2008).
In addition, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, offsetting
markets for conservation seem likely to tend towards net
losses of habitat (Wilcove & Lee 2004; Fox & Nino-
Murcia 2005), as quantified for wetland mitigation banking
by Robertson and Hayden (2008). This arises because
conservation banking is development dependent. That is, it
occurs against the assumption that more development will
occur which, under current regulatory contexts, will require
purchase of conservation credits so as to offset impacts (Mead
2008). Indeed, development that produces transformation of
habitats is required for conservation credits to attain the prices
that will encourage establishment of conservation banks and
bankers, thereby generating trade in conservation credits as a
funding strategy for conservation management.
Species banking is a form of conservation banking whereby
protected species can be lost in one location through develop-
ment, provided such degradation is offset through purchase
of government-awarded species credits in another location
managed for conservation (Wilcove & Lee 2004; Fox & Nino-
Murcia 2005). Given the credit-bearing function of the latter
locations, they have become termed ‘species banks’, and
complement an increasing array of ‘nature banks’, including
wetland mitigation banks, biodiversity banks and habitat
banks. According to the website www.SpeciesBanking.com,
over 200 000 acres (81 000 ha; 1 acre = 0.4047 ha) currently are
protected in the USA as ‘species banks’ (for consistency and
ease of reference, species banking land areas are referred to in
acres here because this is the unit measure used in USA species
banking policy, practice, documentation and legislation).
Species banks enable landowners to gain economically from
conserving rather than ‘taking’ species on their land, through
trading government awarded species credits with developers
who may damage protected species on land elsewhere. Species
banking was estimated to be worth US$ 100–370 million
per annum in 2008 (Bayon 2008; Madsen et al. 2010). It is
inspired by, and complements, wetland mitigation banking
in the USA since the early 1970s, worth over US$ 3 billion
annually (Bayon 2008; Madsen et al. 2010).
Species banking allows for ‘off-site’ mitigation that
currently is ‘in-kind’, namely based on the same species,
although ‘out-of-kind’ mitigation between different species
is suggested as a possibility (ten Kate et al. 2004, pp. 61–66).
Conservation banking operates in the USA, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and Brazil, with programmes in development
in countries including Colombia, Paraguay and the UK
(Briggs et al. 2009; Madsen et al. 2010). We use ‘species
banking’ to refer specifically to the context of mitigation
through purchase of species credits. Mead (2008, p. 19) writes
that ‘annual reports from conservation managers, easement
holders and agency biologists appear to indicate that generally
conservation banking is an ecologically successful method
for offsetting impacts to many species’, but that ‘detailed
biological studies. . . have yet to be conducted’ (see also
Robertson & Hayden 2008, p. 636). Three data based reviews
of USA species banking suggest that ecological success is
unclear (Wilcove & Lee 2004; Fox & Nino-Murcia’s 2005;
Madsen et al. 2010).
USA species banking developed as a consequence of
federal and state legislative frameworks for the protection
of endangered and threatened species (Wilcove & Lee 2004;
Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005). We focus here on the federal
framework. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973
(with principal amendments in 1978, 1982, 1988 and 2004)
grants the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) authority to
designate and protect species as ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened’
(Ruhl 2004, pp. 421–422; FWS 2010a). Once a species is
protected, the FWS identifies critical habitat and recovery
plans for that species. Until 1982, the ESA generally
prohibited landowners from ‘taking’ threatened or endangered
species, where ‘take’ means to ‘harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct’ (LII [Legal Information Institute]
no date a; Ruhl 2004, pp. 421–422). Although the goal of the
ESA was (and is) to ‘halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost’ (Tenn. Valley Authority versus
Hill, 437 US 153, 185–185 (1978) cited in Ruhl 2004, p. 423),
it elicited the opposite response from some landowners who
sought to remove protected species from their land before
discovery by the FWS (ten Kate et al. 2004; Wilcove & Lee
2004; Bayon 2008). In a situation where ‘[a]pproximately half
of listed species have at least 80 percent of their habitat on
private lands’ (FWS 2009a, p. 1), the impact of these actions
could have been devastating.
To address these possibly perverse outcomes, and balance
the economic interests of landowners with species protection,
the ESA was amended in 1982 to introduce a permit
programme allowing landowners to ‘take’ protected species,
provided such takings do not ‘appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the
wild’ (LII no date b; Ruhl 2004, pp. 430–433; Bayon 2008,
p. 130). Landowners are required to show how they will
‘minimize and mitigate’ proposed harm to a protected species,
a mitigation possibility being the purchase of species credits
from a species bank (Ruhl 2004, p. 435; FWS 2009b). This
mitigation mechanism requires a supply of species banks.
Landowners, including those seeking to offset their own harm,
can apply to the FWS to establish species banks on their land,
thereby converting the presence of protected species from
‘liabilities’ into economic ‘assets’ (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005,
p. 997). Approved species banks ‘generate income [through
sale of conservation credits, and direct payments], keep large
parcels of land intact, and possibly reduce. . . taxes’ (FWS
2009b, p. 1) through government subsidies (Morris 2006).
The FWS has been authorizing species banks since the
early 1990s, and, in 2003, issued formal guidance regarding
‘establishment, use and operation’ of species banks (FWS
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2003, p. 1). In terms of number of banks, the industry has
been dominated by the company Wildlands Inc., a for-profit
habitat development, land management and environmental
planning company established in 1991, and creating its first
mitigation bank in 1994 (see Bayon et al. 2008).
Species banks can be established on privately-owned land
or tribal, state or local government land (FWS 2009b, p.
2). To establish a bank, a landowner enters into a legal
agreement with the FWS, which sets forth the terms and
conditions under which the bank will function, and includes
information on the funding and management of the bank, the
location and ‘service area’ of the bank, and the methodology
for determining credits (FWS 2003, p. 15, 2009b, p. 2).
As part of the process, the landowner is required to place
a perpetual conservation easement on the land, whereby
the landowner agrees with the easement holder, typically a
land trust, government agency or non-profit organization,
to restrict use of the land to conservation thus prohibiting
commercial and real estate development. The easement ‘runs
with the land’ such that the holder can enforce the easement
against subsequent owners of the land, in perpetuity (Fox
& Nino-Murcia 2005; FWS 2009b). The landowner must
prove able to fund the conservation goals of the bank (FWS
2003). The sale of offset credits is a key part of bank funding
strategies (FWS 2003), together with private investment and
non-wasting endowments, such as interest bearing accounts
where only the interest is made available for use by the bank
(FWS 2009b).
Conservation strategy at species banks can be based on
‘preservation, management, restoration of degraded habitat,
connecting separate habitats, buffering already protected
areas, and creation of habitat’, depending on the species to be
protected, as well as the condition of bank habitat (FWS 2003,
p. 7). Parties requiring mitigation currently must purchase
offset credits in banks that are in the same ‘service area’ as
the harm they are intended to mitigate. This should be based
on conservation criteria (FWS 2003), but may reflect local
government interest in maintaining both harm and mitigation
within its ‘local planning area’ (Mead 2008, p. 25), as well
as a bank’s need for a large enough area to support sufficient
income through credit sales (Bonnie & Wilcove 2008).
Species credits in their ‘simplest form’ are based on
acreage, but can also be based on measures such as
numbers of breeding pairs or population per acre (FWS
2003; Bonnie & Wilcove 2008). The number of credits
awarded by the FWS to a species bank depends on factors
including ‘habitat quality, habitat quantity, species covered,
conservation benefits, including contribution to regional
conservation efforts, property location and configuration, and
available or prospective resource values’ (FWS 2003, p. 9).
Banks with higher quality habitat are likely to be awarded more
credits by acreage and will have higher credit-to-acreage credit
ratios (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005). The number of credits a
mitigator needs to purchase is determined by the FWS during
the incidental taking permit process, and depends upon the
intensity of the mitigation required (Fox & Nino-Murcia
2005). The basis of a mitigator’s harm should reflect the
basis of the credit they are purchasing (FWS 2003; Bonnie
& Wilcove 2008), and destruction of higher quality habitats
requires purchase of a greater number of credits.
A critical recent development in the species banking
industry is the establishment of the SpeciesBanking.com web-
site, the evolution of which is detailed in Zwick (2008). The
platform was launched in December 2008 as a project of the
Ecosystem Marketplace (www.ecosystemmarketplace.com) to
streamline the mitigation process and reduce transaction costs
(Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005). It was ‘spearheaded’ by Ricardo
Bayon, a co-founder of the Ecosystem Marketplace, prior to
his leaving to co-found EKO Asset Management Partners, a
merchant bank for investing in new environmental markets
(www.ekoamp.com). SpeciesBanking.com is intended to be
an ‘information hub’ or ‘clearinghouse’ platform for species
banking that, through providing ‘[a] comprehensive and
current listing of banks and their credit information’ will
aid ‘buyers and sellers to conduct transactions at a reduced
cost’ (Zwick 2008). SpeciesBanking.com is based on the
premise that ‘if species banking is to deliver environmental
benefits on a grand scale, it needs to be as transparent,
fair, and open as the most advanced equities markets’
(Zwick 2008). In March 2011, SpeciesBanking.com ‘went
global’ and now includes information on biodiversity-related
offsets initiatives worldwide. It aspires to be the ‘Bloomberg
[www.bloomberg.com] of Species Banking’ (Zwick 2008), by
acting as a platform to facilitate banking transactions.
In this paper, we analyse material pertaining to species
banking in the USA to trace specific mechanisms through
which such shifts in conservation management are bound with,
and support, broader neoliberal policies. Our intention is to
highlight ecological and economic patterns associated with
movements towards conservation banking more generally,
exemplified here by USA species banking. Mitigation
practices that manage environmental degradation through
offsetting trades in conservation measures derive from
neoliberal conservation principles (McAfee 1999; Sullivan
2006; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Büscher et al. 2012). Key
to this is the policy decision to solve environmental problems
by creating markets for profitable exchange of measures of
environmental health and damage as commodities, rather
than through punishment for non-compliance or through
acknowledging intrinsic value (Hahn 2000; Morris 2006). A
core proposition of neoliberalism is that, given appropriate
pricing mechanisms and private property arrangements,
markets are the most efficient means for distributing goods,
services and harms in evermore areas of social organization
(Peck & Tickell 2002). We thus analyse ways that species
banking appears structured by specific neoliberal policies,
namely privatization, de- and re-regulation, marketization
and liberalization, as highlighted by Castree (2008a, b).
We also trace how species presence is transformed into
tradable species credits so as to illuminate the commodification
processes operative in this conservation area (Kosoy &
Corbera 2010). The current design of new markets is
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Table 1 Email survey respondents.
Species bank name Species bank owner Species bank manager
Cajon Creek Habitat Conservation
Management Area
Vulcan Materials Company Vulcan Materials Company
Campbell Ranch Conservation Bank R-E-Solutions Inc. R-E-Solutions Inc.
Chiquita Canyon Conservation Bank Foothill/Eastern Transportation
Corridor Agency
Ornage County Transportation
Corridor Agency
Whelan Ranch Conservation Bank Bank of America Center for Natural Lands
Management
East Plum Creek Conservation Bank Colorado Department of
Transportation
Colorado Department of
Transportation
Barry Jones (aka Skunk Hollow)
Wetland Mitigation Bank
McCollum Associates Not listed on SpeciesBanking.com
additionally facilitated and transformed by technological
innovations in information and communication technologies
(ICTs), particularly the internet (Jackson 2009), hence our
attention here to the online species banking clearinghouse,
www.SpeciesBanking.com. ICTs permit connectivity and
ease of transactions between buyers and sellers, at the
same time as shaping the sorts of products that can be
marketed and traded via electronic exchanges. Although
producing varied engagements and outcomes (Larner 2000;
Peck & Tickell 2002; Ferguson 2010), neoliberalism tends
generically towards the movement of public institutional and
environmental domains into privatized arenas of profitable
exchange. While celebrated as permitting self-organizing and
rational allocations of goods and bads and thus reducing
government bureaucracy and regulation, neoliberal policies
also require considerable work by governments and civil
society to create and maintain the regulatory frameworks that
support ‘free markets’ (Peck & Tickell 2002; Castree 2008a;
Foucault 2008[1979]). Extension of these tendencies into the
arena of environmental conservation make the documentation
and analysis of their structuring effects essential in order
to gain traction on relevant influences driving conservation
policy and their likely ecological and distributive effects.
METHODS
We conducted two surveys of the USA species banking
industry, via the industry web platform SpeciesBanking.com.
Questions were oriented towards clarifying current
bank characteristics, recorded transactions and possible
conservation outcomes. In June and July 2010, we manually
compiled information from the bank profiles of all 123 species
banks then listed on SpeciesBanking.com (hereafter ‘site
survey’). This was complemented by a questionnaire emailed
to those species banks listed on SpeciesBanking.com for
which an address for the bank manager or bank owner was
provided (hereafter ‘email survey’). Since bank owners and
managers can be different people, we only emailed the bank
manager if email addresses for both owners and managers
were listed, and emailed the owner only if the bank manager’s
email was not listed. We gave the banks around six weeks to
respond and did not send any reminder emails. Ninety-one
banks were sent this survey, of which 14 bounced. For 36
of the species banks contacted, the managers manage only
one species bank. For the rest, the managers manage more
than one bank. Wildlands, Inc., the company spearheading
species banking as a conservation strategy, owns and manages
20 and 31 banks respectively, and received emails for each bank
plus an additional email explaining why they were receiving
so many requests. They did not respond and it is unclear
to us why they chose not to participate with information
for any of their banks. This had a disproportionate effect
on the response rate for this survey, for which we received
completed questionnaires from a total of seven banks (see
Table 1, excluding one respondent who wished to remain
anonymous). One owner stated explicitly that they did not
wish to participate in the survey. Another responded, but did
not complete the survey due to the bank being inactive. The
full surveys and responses can be viewed by request to the
authors. Clearly this second survey should be engaged with
as indicative rather than representative. We include the data
gathered because they add texture to the figures presented
from our complete survey of the species bank data available
on SpeciesBanking.com at the time of our survey.
RESULTS
On SpeciesBanking.com there are fields for information on
the banks, credits, credit asking prices, credit transactions
and the protected species, making it possible to search for
information by bank, species, transaction and state. The home
page features a ‘Market Snapshot’ of the industry, which,
in August 2010 listed 133 USA species banks, 92 species
credit types, 51 habitat credit types, 12 states with species
banks, and 112 103.50 acres of land area protected by species
banks. SpeciesBanking.com is in control of placing content
on the site. Information is provided for each bank profile
(Table 2).
Of the 123 species banks in the site survey, 76 were active,
five were inactive, 21 were pending, 19 were sold out of
credits and so not trading, and for two banks data were not
available. Of the 116 banks for which establishment dates
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Table 2 Information fields for species bank profiles available on SpeciesBanking.com.
Information type Information field
Bank Name of the bank
A picture (not necessarily of the bank)
City (or county) and state where located
Status of the bank (active, sold out, inactive)
Service area
Date established
Size in acreage
Type of agreement governing the bank
Species protected (with links to more information about the species)
Ecological prescription (whether the bank is preserving, creating, restoring or
enhancing habitat for the protected species)
Maps of the bank area
Contact Species bank owner name and contact information
Species bank manager name and contact information
Lead agency name and contact information
Credit Total credits the bank was awarded (by the FWS)
Total credits the bank has sold
Credits awarded per species
Credits sold per species
Asking price per credit per species
Credit ratio per species
Link to transactions
Figure 1 Numbers of species
banks established by year, from
1990–2010. Total number of
banks = 123 in July 2010.
were available, the following were noted: the first species bank
was established in 1991; the years when the most species
banks were established were 1997 and 2007 (nine and 12
banks, respectively); and an increase in species banking is
indicated by the fact that 21 banks were pending at the time
of our survey (Fig. 1). Species banks ranged from 8.11 acres
to 27 470 acres, the majority being between 100 and 1000
acres (see Fig. 2). Most (107) banks were listed as preserving
already conserved habitat. There was a handful of significantly
large banks, including the Balcones Canyonlands Preserve
owned by City of Austin and Travis County (27 470 acres),
the Chevron Lokern Conservation Bank owned by Chevron
USA Production Company (14 400 acres) and the Coles
Levee Ecosystem Preserve owned by Aera Energy, LLC (6059
acres). We identified the top and bottom 10 bank owners by
aggregate acreage, their names providing some indication of
the organizations involved with species banking (Table 3).
The majority of bank owners own five or fewer banks. For 66
of the species banks no maps are provided, and when they are
they tend to be vague or show approximate locations only.
Few data on credits awarded and exchanged were available
on SpeciesBanking.com, despite provision made for these
fields in the bank information pages (Table 2). Sixty-four
banks posted the total number of credits awarded to the bank
and 27 posted total credits awarded per species. Fifty-two
banks posted the total number of credits sold, and 33 banks
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Figure 2 Size of USA species bankings by land area (given in acres
to reflect units used in USA species banking), represented as a
percentage of total number of species banks (123 in July 2010) on
SpeciesBanking.com.
posted the numbers of credits sold per species. Only seven
of the surveyed 123 species banks posted their credit asking
prices.
We accessed more detail on these aspects through our email
survey, albeit for only a small number of banks. Respondents
indicated that credits for four (of seven) banks were awarded
for bank acres, and for two of the banks were sold as habitat
or wetland credits (instead of species credits), also based on
acres. For one of the banks credits were based on breeding
pairs and plants per acre. One bank in the email survey did
not know the basis of the credits, as the bank owner (not the
bank manager) sold the credits. For income, three banks relied
on species credit sales as their primary source of funding, two
relied on endowment payments, one bank was owned by the
government and one relied on private investment. All six banks
that produced monitoring reports responded that they made
them publicly available. Two of the seven banks in the email
survey provided public access to the species banks.
DISCUSSION
Our surveys indicate that species banks have increased in
number, that total bank area is growing, that the land owned
and managed by specific owners is consolidated in a handful
of owners, and that publicly available data on actual trade in
species credits, accompanied by asking and received prices, is
sparse. Most species banks appear to be preservation banks
and thus focus on already conserved areas. This suggests
that although registration as a species bank might permit
access to more tradable monetary value, the new status as
a species bank may represent limited additionality in terms
of species conservation. We also note that a rationale for
bank establishment is legitimization of degradation due to
development elsewhere and facilitates development-related
species loss. Clarifying the conservation implications of these
characteristics will require further in-depth field research.
We engage these data and observations by evaluating
contextual tendencies at work in species banking. In particular,
we consider how neoliberal policies, as introduced above,
are shaping the species banking industry. We draw on
the particular diagnostic frameworks of Castree (2008a,
b) and Kosoy and Corbera (2010). Castree reviewed
Table 3 Top and bottom 10
species bank owners by total
acreage.
Rank Bank name Acreage owned
Top ten acreage:
1 City of Austin and Travis County 27 470.00
2 Chevron USA Production Company 14 400.00
3 Wildlands Inc. 13 900.86
4 Aera Energy, LLC 6059.00
5 Conservation Resources LLC 3661.00
6 Westervelt Ecological Services 3547.03
7 Kern Water Bank Authority 3267.00
8 Dr. Donn Campion 3233.50
9 Greg Reden 2400.00
10 Loafer Creek, LLC 2400.00
Bottom ten acreage:
1 Colorado Department of Transportation 25.30
2 Linda & Domenico Carinalli 28.00
3 All American Pipeline Company Total 35.00
4 Slippery Rock, LLC 38.00
5 Sonoma Vernal Pool, Inc. 39.40
6 Christopher Desmond 48.30
7 County of San Diego, Department of Public Works 60.02
8 PCO, LLC 63.00
9 Alton Preserve, LLC 64.79
10 Environmental Mitigation Exchange Company
(EMAX)
73.73
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privatization, de- and re-regulations of state power, and
the marketization/commodification nexus in the context of
changing natural resource management as critical aspects
of a contemporary ‘neoliberalisation of nature’. Kosoy and
Corbera (2010) explained the commodification of ecosystem
services in mitigation schemes as a three-step process through
which (1) such services are reduced to units for trade, (2)
such units are designated single exchange values and (3)
market infrastructure is established to permit and publicize
trade in these units. We define these disaggregated but
interconnected phenomena, and trace their relevance for
explaining both the rise of species banking as an approach to
biodiversity conservation and the specific patterns observable
on SpeciesBanking.com as the industry’s authoritative
information source and nascent market exchange. We suggest
that these processes occur in iterative combination to
consolidate particular outcomes and tendencies.
Privatization
Privatization allows formal property rights to adhere to
things, thereby supporting their saleability (Castree 2008a;
Kosoy & Corbera 2010). In the USA, private property rights
in land are well-established. As such, species banking is
not engaged in initially privatizing or enclosing land, as
may occur in conservation efforts elsewhere (Brockington &
Igoe 2006). USA species banking introduces two different
mechanisms of privatization. First, landowners are required
to bind land to conservation through perpetual conservation
easements (FWS 2009b). These permit landowners to ‘receive
direct payment or tax subsidies for selling or donating
easements’ without surrendering land titles (Morris 2006,
p. 1216). Since they ‘privatize and re-scale a great deal of
land conservation decision-making authority’, are market-
based, ‘provide financial incentives for participation rather
than punishment for non-compliance’ and ‘commodify new
property rights’, they are deemed to be a paradigmatic, if
sometimes contradictory, ‘neoliberal environmental policy’
(Morris 2006, p. 1215). Second, the FWS creates a set
of ‘alienable, fungible and mobile’ rights (Robertson 2004,
p. 369) by awarding species credits that can be sold to
those requiring mitigation. Through this dual process of
privatization, conserved nature is the aspect that is enclosed
to create derived tradable commodity forms of conservation
measures, the financial value of which is accessed by owners
of credit-bearing conservation stock under formal property
structures.
Deregulation, reduction of state power and
market-friendly re-regulation
Castree (2008a, p. 148) identified particular regulatory and
governance structures associated with neoliberal approaches
to environmental management and exploitation. In general,
state power is scaled back in favour of markets, which function
in part through civil society structures and participation. In
the context of USA species banking, the ESA, as originally
conceived, generally prohibited and punished removal of
protected species by landowners. This shifted in 1982, when
the ESA introduced a permit programme allowing incidental
taking of protected species (as described above) (Ruhl 2004).
In the 1990s, Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior in the
Clinton administration, publicized the permit programme,
together with procedures to encourage its use, and permits
issued grew from 12 in 1992, to 227 in 1997 (Ruhl 2004).
Following Peck and Tickell (2002), this is consistent with
the ‘rolling back’ of the state associated in the USA and UK
with the Clinton-Blair administrations, and which extended
the neoliberal Reagan-Thatcher policies that dismantled the
Keynesian institutions upheld by previous governments (see
also Robertson 2004, pp. 369–371).
Market friendly re-regulation occurs as state policies
and institutions are deployed ‘to facilitate privatisation
and marketisation of ever wider spheres of social and
environmental life’ (Castree 2008a, p. 142). During Babbit’s
term, species banking was being developed as a logical
extension to the incidental taking permit programme and
was modelled on the wetland mitigation banking programmes
already established under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
(Ruhl 2004). By approving species banks and authorizing the
sale of species credits on one side, and requiring mitigation
and the purchase of species credits on the other, the FWS
began to operate as a market manager in developing market
proxies as incentives in conservation management (Ruhl 2004;
Castree 2008a).
Champions of neoliberalism tend to celebrate the
diminutions of state regulation with which it is associated. In
fact, however, the state’s role is transformed so as to provide
appropriate regulatory and supportive structures for the
existence and functioning of expanding commodity markets
(Peck & Tickell 2002; Castree 2008a; Foucault 2008[1979]).
Instead of being the entity that protects and provides public
goods, the state provides legislative and regulatory support
for the transfer of previously publicly managed goods to
the allocation possibilities deriving from privatized market
exchange of newly alienable commodities. This is illustrated
by species banking. Through making possible and regulating
the conversion of species presence into tradable species
credits, the FWS effectively is working to engender new
markets in species credits for private gain as the means of
ensuring development-led protection of species on private
land.
Marketization
The above processes turn ‘previously untradable things into
tradable commodities’ (Igoe & Brockington 2007, p. 437;
Castree 2008a). The assumption is that conservation outcomes
with the least transaction costs and the greatest efficiency will
emerge from the bargaining of market participants (Muradian
et al. 2010). For Kosoy and Corbera (2010), conservation
commodification involves (1) reduction of natural processes
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to standard units of exchange; (2) the assigning of single
exchange-values to those units; and (3) the linking of buyers
and sellers through market or market-like exchanges. We now
discuss our SpeciesBanking.com data in relation to these three
processes.
Units of exchange
The transformation of conserved nature into units of exchange
requires its disaggregation into standard units of measurement
(Robertson 2009). With respect to species banking, the FWS
(2003) suggested that the simplest form of species credits is
based on acreage, but can also be based on measurements such
as numbers of breeding pairs or population per acre. Acreage
tends to be the dominant unit of exchange in providing offset
credits (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; Madsen et al. 2010), and
our email survey of bank managers confirmed this. In our
introduction, we noted that the use of unit land area as the
basis for species credits is unlikely to represent or measure
the ecological complexities of either habitat destruction or
mitigation activities (Bonnie & Wilcove 2008). As these
mitigation markets take hold, independent investigation into
the overall conservation and ecological implications of such
tradable reductions will be essential.
Single exchange value
For units of exchange to become tradable in conservation
banking they need to assume prices. Species banking relies
on establishment of a single value for species credits, based
on monetary prices as reflected in exchanges. Credit prices
(that is the monetary exchange value) can include different
factors specific to the bank and to the species, but should
reflect ‘habitat quality, habitat quantity, species covered
[and] conservation benefits’ (FWS 2003, p. 9). Ultimately,
however, credit prices reflect the willingness of a bank to sell
(supply) and of a buyer to purchase (demand), combined with
government subsidies and availability of legitimate species
credits at particular moments in time, which in turn are
dependent on ecological as well as managerial factors.
In neoliberal theory, more transparency means better price
discovery through helping buyers and sellers to find the right
price (Muradian et al. 2010). In reality, however, private
negotiations, known as over-the-counter (OTC) exchanges,
and various forms of lobbying and government subsidies
prevail, meaning that whilst the free market is idealized
in neoliberal rhetoric it rarely is realized in actuality (R.
Fletcher & J. Breitling, personal communication regarding
PES schemes in Costa Rica 2011). Species banking appears to
be no different. Transactions tend to be privately negotiated,
such that banks have the flexibility to charge prices customized
to individual circumstances (Zwick 2008). As observed in
our site survey, prices tend not to be publicly available,
and whether or not credit asking prices become posted on
SpeciesBanking.com in the future remains to be seen.
Linking buyers and sellers in market-like exchanges
The linking of buyers and sellers of newly derived units
of exchange through market or market-like exchanges is
the third step in creating tradable ecosystem services
commodities (Kosoy & Corbera 2010), involving construction
of ‘institutional structures for. . . ecosystem services’
appropriation and exchange’ (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010,
p. 1215). The SpeciesBanking.com platform is the key
information hub for the USA species banking market and,
as such, represents an initial indication of development and
yield possibilities for species offset markets. While not yet in
itself an exchange, whereby the purchase and sale of species
credits can occur through the site, SpeciesBanking.com
does provide basic credit information as well as transaction
history and bank information from which an exchange may
develop.
According to Michael Van Patten, CEO and Founder
of Mission Markets (missionmarkets.com) which currently
operates a private exchange for social and environmental
capital markets, SpeciesBanking.com ‘will create the kind of
information flows that could make an electronic exchange for
biodiversity markets feasible’ (quoted in Zwick 2008). Indeed,
SpeciesBanking.com seems to be becoming an electronic
exchange for species credit markets, with the launch in
May 2010 of a new registry for bank and credit data, in
a collaboration between Markit (a leading global financial
information services company expanding into an array of
‘environmental assets’ and sponsor of SpeciesBanking.com),
the Ecosystems Marketplace, SpeciesBanking.com and the
FWS (Markit 2010a, b; Madsen et al. 2010; Madsen &
Percival 2010). This ‘SpeciesBanking.com Registry Pilot’
would permit credits to be managed electronically and traded
in real-time (Markit 2010b). In creating an infrastructure for
online market exchange, SpeciesBanking.com thus is bringing
forth an expanding market which is intended to become
‘an international approach that can inform the world about
best practices – including voluntary initiatives’ (Zwick 2008).
The edge of this frontier is constituted by suggestions for
international out-of-kind species mitigation trade (ten Kate
et al. 2004) in which species credits perhaps could be traded
for species with little or no taxonomic equivalence.
The above points illustrate ways in which species banking
in the USA both upholds and shapes specific neoliberal
conservation policy mechanisms, as specified in the
diagnostic contributions of Castree (2008a, b) and Kosoy &
Corbera (2010). Neoliberal approaches to conservation are
commoditizing nature itself, translating its value and the value
of its individual components into monetary market terms
under the justification of conservation. Given the speed at
which conservation is being directed towards markets in new
conservation products and exchanges, it seems important to
engage with the assumption that markets can make the right
decisions for conservation. While the goals of markets and of
conservation may intersect given the right set of drivers, they
are not necessarily synchronized.
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At a very basic level, for example, the goal of species
banking is not fully aligned with the goal of the ESA. The
goal of the ESA is species recovery (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005;
Madsen et al. 2010), while the goal of species banking is the
mitigation of damage done to species by development (Fox
2009). Further research is needed to monitor the expansion
and/or enhancing of conserved habitat that thereby occurs,
with emphasis placed on documenting possible net loss and
additionality issues. Robertson and Hayden (2008), in their
case study of entrepreneurial wetland banking in Chicago,
also observed a tendency for conservation credits to be sold
after sites received protection status but prior to being able to
demonstrate ecological performance compliance. Although we
are unable to confirm this for species banking, this would imply
the accessing of income from trade of species credits before
any additional conservation value of species banks is demon-
strated. This again is an issue worthy of further investigation.
Research might also be directed towards elucidating
ways in which species credits connect with commodity
markets and thereby become bound with prevailing market
conditions. Species banks relying on credit sales to fund
conservation initiatives, for example, may become vulnerable
to falls in credit sales associated with broader economic
downturns, which in turn reduces development requirements
for mitigation at a time when numbers of species banks are
increasing. This is noted for 20 species banks in Northern
California, which exhibited ‘steady increase’ from 2005–2008,
followed by a decrease of almost 20% in 2009, considered
related to falls in development requirements for species
mitigation credits associated with financial crisis and the
collapse of the Californian housing market (Madsen et al.
2010). Species banks relying on interest from a non-wasting
endowment may also be affected by periods when interest
rates are low, as currently is the case in the USA (FWS 2003).
CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have highlighted the current significance
of species banking as an expanding part of the conservation
repertoire in the USA and elsewhere. Neoliberal policies are
critically transforming environmental conservation through
creating markets in commoditized forms of environmental
health and damage, with both biophysical and societal
outcomes (Castree 2008b; Norgaard 2010). Through reliance
on profit maximization they may ‘crowd out’ other motives
for conservation including altruism, empathy and a sense of
ethical responsibility (Kosoy & Corbera 2010).
Species banks are a key component of these approaches to
conservation, providing an illuminating case for studying their
form and effects. We have noted the economic incentives that
can result in species conservation in species banks to be able to
mobilize credits for profitable exchange with developers. We
have expressed concerns that such market-based approaches
to conservation rely on some significant concealments,
including: a possible net loss of habitat to development;
an ecologically unintuitive and problematic assumption
of equivalence between different species populations and
localities; consolidation of emerging conservation land values
amongst existing landowners; and dependence on markets for
solving conservation problems, thus making environmental
conservation vulnerable to other market drivers. We have also
made some suggestions for future research. The conservation
implications of species banking as a form of offsetting
payments for biodiversity services provide a rich area for
study and documentation as these approaches become further
entrenched in environmental conservation strategy.
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